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Abstract: 
Matching schemes, where a party matches the contribution of others, reduce the effective price 
of a good and aim to foster its demand. We review the empirical literature on the effectiveness 
of these schemes in the context of public goods, especially in the field of charitable giving. As 
different measures of effectiveness are used, we classify results according to (i) the level of 
public good provision, (ii) the amount of individuals’ contributions, (iii) the likelihood to give 
and (iv) the contribution conditional on contributing a positive amount. Generalizing results is 
challenging, since context specific factors matter. Predominantly, a match is found to create a 
significant increase in public good provision without crowding out individuals’ contributions, 
while the effect on the likelihood of giving and contribution condition on contributing a positive 
amount is nonnegative. The discussion reveals several avenues for future research, as putting 
stronger emphasizes on long term effects, public good competition or heterogeneity in 
responses.   
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Although not always apparent, our everyday life offers numerous examples of matching 
schemes: In the field of charitable giving, campaigns stating “we double your donation” are 
used to encourage contributions while in the private sector, supermarkets try to stimulate 
consumption with advertising messages like “buy one get one free”. Similarly, parents use this 
mechanism to steer their children towards saving money, when promising “for each dollar you 
save, you get an additional dollar from us”. The underlying idea of the mechanism is to cut the 
effective price of the corresponding good by offering a subsidy. If the good under consideration 
is an ordinary good, such price reductions are expected to increase the provision or consumption 
level and, in case of a public good, can help to facilitate voluntary public good provision.  
In this literature review, we focus on the experimental findings about the effect of matching 
mechanisms on voluntary public good provision, as matching mechanism offer non-
governmental institutions the possibility to trigger public good contributions without a 
regulating central authority. Empirical studies are mainly situated in the charitable giving 
context, a special case of voluntary public good provision (see Vesterlund 2016 based on 
Becker 1974), which does not necessarily correspond to that of a pure public good. Matching 
mechanisms are of particular interest for fundraisers to increase donations. A wide definition 
of matching would subsume mechanisms sharing the costs of public good provision (Guttman 
1987). In the charitable giving context, a narrower view is taken up to differentiate between 
rebates and matches (see e.g. Eckel & Grossman 2003; Davis et al. 2005).1 Rebates return part 
of the donated money to the donor while passing the entire donation amount to the charity. 
Matches supplement the donated money and both the donation and the match are passed to the 
charity.  
Our emphasis lies on the effectiveness of matching mechanisms in increasing contributions. In 
the review, we concentrate on public good experiments testing explicit matching mechanisms 
and exclude implicit matching as well as mechanisms combined with punishment schemes. Our 
major contribution is twofold. First, we assess and classify the empirical evidence of matching 
schemes according to four different measures of effectiveness, while taking into account 
context specific factors that potentially affect the results. This allows to identify general patterns 
and examine to which extent different findings in the literature can be explained by varying 
conditions. By doing so, we include a broad discussion of long term effects and the 
1 In this strand of the literature, rebates are commonly defined as being realized without any delay. Therefore, they 
are strategically equivalent to matches. 
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effectiveness of matching schemes that go beyond the classical linear structure. Second, we 
build upon this detailed review to identify research gaps and make suggestions for future 
research.  
A previous literature review by Vesterlund (2016) is related to our review as it provides a 
comprehensive overview of experimental results on the motives of charitable giving and 
different fundraising mechanisms aiming to increase giving. Her survey includes a basic 
summary on matching and rebates with a particular focus on comparing these two. She 
concludes that based on the resulting level of the public good, matches are more effective than 
rebates, which is in line with experiments explicitly testing matching versus rebates (Eckel & 
Grossman 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2017; Davis et al. 2005; Lukas et al. 2010; Bekkers 2015).  
In the following section, we briefly describe matching mechanisms in the public good context 
and introduce the four different measures of effectiveness. Based on this differentiation, we 
provide the result of the selective literature in section three and discuss long-term effects as 
well as extended considerations beyond linear matching. Finally, we draw conclusions and 
highlight opportunities for future research.  
2. Fundamentals of matching schemes 
The underlying idea of matching in the public good context is to facilitate voluntary public good 
provision by stockpiling the individual’s contribution. The strategic nature of such a mechanism 
is to reduce the effective price of the public good (see e.g. Boadway et al. 1989; Buchholz et al. 
2011; Buchholz et al. 2014; Reif et al. 2017). If demand is price elastic and the public good is 
an ordinary good, which shall be assumed throughout the following review, the level of public 
good provision will increase.  
The empirical literature offers valuable insights about the impact of matching on voluntary 
public good provision. Especially in the context of charitable giving there is a vast number of 
empirical analyses. In such settings some party offers to match the individuals’ contributions to 
the public good at a matching rate 𝑚𝑚 > 0. Based on the matching rate, each individual 𝑖𝑖 decides 
on her public good contribution, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖.2 Thus, the effective price of the public good individual 𝑖𝑖 is 
confronted with depends on the matching rate offered and can be formalized as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  = 1 1 + 𝑚𝑚⁄ . 
2 While in our literature review we examine matching mechanisms in which some party matches the individuals’ 
contributions, it is also possible to allow each individual to match the contributions of others. This is usually 
referred to as two-sided matching, in contrast to the previously described one-sided matching. Due to the 
complexity of such mutual matching, theory as well as empirical studies focus on two player settings in these two-
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Although the law of demand predicts a price decrease to weakly increase the demand for the 
public good, the magnitude of the increase strongly depends on the underlying assumptions, i.e. 
information on individuals’ preferences. Karlan & List (2007) as well as Huck & Rasul (2011) 
discuss how different preferences alter the predicted behavioral response to a match. As these 
preferences are usually not common knowledge, empirical and especially experimental 
analyses are necessary to evaluate the effect of matching mechanisms on public good provision. 
Since this lack of information also prevents researchers from determining the social optimum, 
alternative measures – inclusive contributions, checkbook giving, extensive margin, and 
intensive margin – are used to judge the effectiveness of a matching scheme. In this literature 
review, we summarize the results of different studies for these outcomes. We use the following 
definitions and formally summarize them in Table 1. The effectiveness of matching is captured 
by comparing the corresponding outcomes across treatments, e.g. match and no match. 
A straightforward way to measure the effectiveness of matching is to analyze the provision 
level of public goods with and without a matching scheme in place. In the charitable giving 
context, the level of a public good is captured by the amount of money an organization receives 
including the match payment provided by a third party. We refer to this as inclusive 
contributions. As control and treatment groups often differ in exact group size, evidence is 
commonly based on the inclusive contribution per individual. 
Although inclusive contributions offer an important measure of effectiveness, fundraisers or 
policy makers might be specifically interested in the effect on contributions made by individuals 
excluding the matching payment. In line with Eckel & Grossman (2008), we refer to this as 
checkbook giving. As pointed out before, matching is expected to have a non-negative effect on 
inclusive contributions, but the prediction for checkbook giving is ambiguous. A match might 
decrease the level of checkbook giving, which is referred to as crowding out of private 
contributions. As inclusive contributions and checkbook giving are closely linked, we can use 
the price elasticity with respect to the former to conclude on the latter: a price elasticity of 
inclusive contributions above −1 indicates crowding out, whereas one below −1 represents 
crowding in.   
While an inclusive contribution depends on checkbook giving, checkbook giving itself 
aggregates two behavioral responses: (i) the likelihood of contributing, which we refer to as 
sided matching approaches (see e.g. Guttman 1978; Buchholz & Konrad 1995; Andreoni & Varian 1999; Charness 
et al. 2007; Bracht et al. 2008). In the following, whenever we talk about matching we refer to one-sided matching. 
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extensive margin, and (ii) the contribution conditional on contributing a positive amount 
denoted as intensive margin or conditional checkbook giving. Therefore, a lack of sensitivity 
on the level of checkbook giving might be explained by the absence of any behavioral 
adjustment, or e.g. an increase in the likelihood of contributing paired with a counterbalanced 
decrease in conditional checkbook giving.  
Table 1: Outcomes of interest 
Inclusive 
contributions 
Checkbook giving Extensive margin Intensive margin 
Level of public good 
provision/charity 
receipts 
Amount provided by 
the contributor 
(excluding the match) 
Likelihood of 
contributing a positive 
amount 
Checkbook giving of 
contributors 
    
𝐸𝐸[𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑚𝑚)|𝑚𝑚,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖] 𝐸𝐸[𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖|𝑚𝑚,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖] Pr (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 0|𝑚𝑚,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  𝐸𝐸[𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖|𝑚𝑚,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 0] 
    
Note: 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the individual’s contribution, 𝑚𝑚 is the matching rate and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are other factors which might be considered 
and do not need to be individual specific.  
 
3. Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of matching schemes  
Although Guttman (1978) defines all forms of voluntary sharing of cost for a collective good 
as implicit matching, experiments are by and large designed to make matching explicit. The 
reason is that implicit matching makes it difficult to separate the matching effect from the 
voluntary public good contribution. In the following, we only consider such explicit matching 
mechanisms and further exclude schemes with any punishment parameters. This means that 
subjects learn the matching rate and subsequently decide about their contribution. Thereby, we 
take the narrow definition of matching, according to which matches are a supplement to the 
donated money a charity obtains. This selection is based on two reasons: First, the large body 
of experiments on charitable giving has shaped the narrower definition of matching by 
explicitly distinguishing rebates from matches and analyzing the behavioral response to each 
subsidy scheme.  
Second, there is already a vast amount of analyses focusing on matching versus rebates (see 
e.g. Eckel & Grossman 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2017; Davis et al. 2005; Davis 2006; Lukas 
et al. 2010; Bekkers 2015 or for an overview Vesterlund 2016). A common result of this 
literature is that matches outperform rebates on the basis of inclusive contributions received by 
the charity. Due to the persistent difference in results between matches and rebates, pooling is 
problematic. Therefore, we focus on the effectiveness of matching mechanisms only.  
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As charitable giving is an important area in which matching is commonly applied, it is not 
surprising that empirical evidence is almost exclusively obtained in donation related settings. 
Based on the different measures of effectiveness introduced above (see Table 1), we discuss the 
effects of matching mechanisms in the corresponding subsections. In general, subjects can 
marginally adjust their individual contributions within a certain range. Furthermore, most of 
the studies subsequently discussed focus on linear matching and compare the effect of matching 
to a baseline scenario without matching. Deviations from this framework, like non-linear 
matching schemes, discrete choice settings or donation unrelated frameworks, are explicitly 
stated. Table 2 in the Appendix supplements the following review by providing an overview 
about the short-term effect of introducing matching estimated by the selective literature. As in 
the review below, in Table 2 we differentiate between four measures of effectiveness and take 
special features of settings into account.   
3.1. Inclusive contributions 
In line with the theoretical prediction, laboratory experiments suggest a positive effect on 
inclusive contributions (Eckel & Grossman 2003, 2006b; Davis et al. 2005; Davis 2006; Lukas 
et al. 2010). All these studies are based on some form of a modified dictator game, in which 
subjects allocate money between themselves and a chosen or pre-determined charity. Each 
individual faces several donation decisions on a single sheet, differing in whether matching is 
offered and to which extent the individual’s contribution is matched by the experimenter. As 
these studies are primarily concerned with a comparison of match and rebate, decision sheets 
sometimes contain both frames (Eckel & Grossman 2003; Davis et al. 2005; Davis 2006).  
To quantify the magnitude of the effect, one might take a look at the average inclusive 
contributions across different treatment groups. For example, Davis et al. (2005) find that 
implementing a 0.5 match increases inclusive contributions by about 62% when individuals are 
endowed with $8, which is close to the percentage increase found by Davis (2006) for the same 
matching rate in a different setting. We calculate the implied price elasticity of inclusive 
contributions to be –1.19, which indicates crowding in. Davis et al. (2005) and Davis (2006) 
additionally consider a matching rate of 1, while Eckel & Grossman (2003, 2006b) and Lukas 
et al. (2010) implement matching rates of 0.25, 0.33, and 1. Evidence suggests that, in general, 
increasing the matching rate increases inclusive contributions, with two studies actually testing 
for significance (Eckel & Grossman 2003, 2006b). The corresponding price elasticities amount 
to –1.07 and –2.6, respectively. 
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3.2. Checkbook giving 
Price elasticities of inclusive contributions around or below –1 already point towards a zero or 
positive effect on checkbook giving. Indeed, most studies find a significant increase in 
checkbook giving due to linear matching (Karlan & List 2007; Huck et al. 2015; Eckel & 
Grossman 2017), while others either find significant effects only for some matching rates and 
endowments (Davis 2006) or do not find effects significantly different from zero at all (Karlan 
et al. 2011). Most of this evidence is based on fundraising in the field. For example, Karlan & 
List (2007) use a mail-out to former contributors of a non-profit organization implementing 
matching rates of 1, 2, and 3. Comparing the average checkbook giving per solicitation in 
matching treatments to the one in the control group reveals a significant positive increase by 19 
per cent.3 However, the levels of average checkbook giving under the considered matching 
rates do not differ significantly. Such a lack of responsiveness of checkbook giving to the 
magnitude of matching is supported by Bekkers (2015) for matching rates of 0.5 and 1. 
Furthermore, Lukas et al. (2010) conduct a laboratory experiment with matching rates of 0.25, 
0.33, and 1, and two different endowment levels, in which only a matching rate increase from 
0.33 to 1 with an endowment of $10 is found to create a significant increase. Other studies 
considering matching rates not greater than 1 do not test for significance but their descriptive 
statistics rather suggest no additional effect of increasing the matching rate (Eckel & Grossman 
2003; Davis 2006; Karlan et al. 2011). 
The effect of matching on checkbook giving and thus inclusive contributions might not solely 
evolve due to a change in the effective price. As emphasized by Huck & Rasul (2011), matching 
possibly creates a signal for potential contributors, e.g. that the non-profit organization is worth 
supporting. If in a between-subject design people in the control treatment are simply asked for 
donations, the estimated effect on checkbook giving will include both a price and a signaling 
effect. To exclude the latter, it would be necessary to send a similar signal in the control 
treatment, e.g. by mentioning a lead donor who has already provided some funding for the 
project or using a within subject design. Indeed, Gneezy et al. (2014) as well as Huck et al. 
(2015) identify a significant positive effect of linear matching on checkbook giving if a control 
treatment without lead donor is used, while finding no significant effect with a lead donor 
baseline. However, Adena & Huck (2017) use a lead donor treatment as baseline and still find 
3 The effect is only significant if observations from treatments with different matching rates are pooled in the 
regression. If instead checkbook giving is regressed on a treatment dummy as well as the interaction of the 
treatment dummy and a dummy on the matching rate (2 or 3), none of these regressors are significant. The same 
holds with respect to the results for the extensive margin presented later on.  
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a significant increase of about 2.4% in average checkbook giving per solicitation letter sent, 
when introducing a 1:1 match. Together with the evidence on matches being superior to 
equivalent rebates (Eckel & Grossman 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2017; Davis et al. 2005; 
Lukas et al. 2010; Bekkers 2015), this suggests that in practice a matching response might not 
be solely driven by a decrease in the effective price.  
As a non-negative effect on checkbook giving implies an increase in inclusive contributions 
when matching is introduced or the matching rate is raised, findings are in line with the evidence 
on inclusive contributions previously discussed. 
3.3. Extensive margin 
With respect to the extensive margin, it is difficult to identify a general pattern. Huck & Rasul 
(2011) as well as Karlan et al. (2011) do not find a significant effect of matching rates no greater 
than 1 on the aggregate, while Karlan & List (2007) report a significant increase in the extensive 
margin by 0.4 percentage points, when pooling data on matching rates of 1, 2 and 3.4 
Furthermore, Eckel & Grossman (2017) identify a significant positive impact for a matching 
rate of 1/3 (8.4 percentage points), but fail to do so for a matching rate of 0.25. Thus, it seems 
that a positive effect on the extensive margin might only arise if the matching rate is sufficiently 
large. Gneezy et al. (2014) offer additional evidence on a positive impact using a matching rate 
of 1, but with a special setting feature in place, determining that the lowest positive donation 
possible amounts to $20.  
As previously discussed, a lead donor baseline might be used to eliminate the signaling effect 
of matching. Gneezy et al. (2014) do so and find that under these conditions the impact of 
matching on the extensive margin vanishes. This lack of response is in line with Huck & Rasul 
(2011) but in contrast to Adena & Huck (2017), who find a significant positive impact of 0.6 
percentage points.5  
A crucial aspect, not only when considering the extensive margin, is that effects might be 
heterogeneous. For example, Eckel & Grossman (2008) send out mails to raise funds for a non-
profit organization which include matching rates of either 0.25 or 1/3. Compared to a baseline 
without a lead donor, the extensive margin of regular contributors with a membership of the 
organization is significantly lower when matching is in place, while such an effect cannot be 
identified for other types of individuals. Although not tested for significance, the descriptive 
4 This effect is substantial since the likelihood of contributing in the control group is 1.8%.  
5 This effect is substantial since the likelihood of contributing in the lead donor control treatment is 1.51%.  
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statistics suggest that this impact is strong enough to decrease average checkbook giving of the 
particular subgroup. This finding constitutes an exception of the previously discussed results 
stating that on the aggregate we do not observe crowding out of checkbook giving. Interestingly, 
the result that more active subjects react negatively to the match might not hold in general. 
Karlan & List (2007) find no considerable difference in their sample of prior donors between 
those donors that have not provided funds in the year of the experiment yet and those that have. 
Karlan et al. (2011) on the other hand detect a negative impact on the extensive margin for the 
former but a significantly higher one for the latter,6 which also holds true with respect to 
checkbook giving. Furthermore, the heterogeneous response is primarily driven by the higher 
matching rate of 1/3. This emphasizes that a lack of impact on the aggregate might be the result 
of substantial heterogeneous effects canceling each other out. 
Moreover, Karlan & List (2007) emphasize a spatial heterogeneity based on whether the 
majority of people in a state voted for George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election. In the 
states that voted for him, the match has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of 
contributing, while for the rest no significant effect occurs. The importance of political aspects 
in this context might be particularly driven by the fact that the involved non-profit organization 
is a political one. Nevertheless, all three studies highlight why heterogeneity in responses is 
worth considering and that exclusively focusing on the aggregate might lead to missing crucial 
response patterns.  
Meier (2007) investigates the donation behavior of students in the field, focusing on a slightly 
different measure. At the time of paying the tuition fees, each student has to decide whether to 
donate to no fund, a single fund, or two funds. Each decision is associated with a fixed amount 
of money. Offering a matching rate of 0.25 or 0.5 for contributing to both funds, pooling the 
data for these into a single treatment, and taking into account pre-treatment differences reveals 
a significant increase in the likelihood of contributing to both funds. However, if the two 
matching treatments are considered separately in a logit regression, the lower matching rate is 
not found to have a significant coefficient while the higher matching rate does. Furthermore, 
the two coefficients are not statistically different. While in Meier (2007) subjects have three 
options to choose from, the contribution decision in Kesternich et al. (2016) is binary. 
Customers of a German long-distance bus operator have the opportunity to offset their carbon 
6 As a result, the point estimate of the effect on the extensive margin of recent donors is positive. However, a test 
on whether this positive effect is significantly different from zero is not provided. 
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emissions at a pre-determined price when purchasing tickets.7 If a match is in place, the 
company itself offsets an additional amount of carbon emissions corresponding to the match 
rate offered. A matching rate of 1/3 creates no effect, but a matching rate of 1 is found to 
significantly increase the likelihood of offsetting compared to the control group, which results 
in a significant increase in checkbook giving. Interestingly, a further increase in the matching 
rate from 1 to 3 does not generate any additional impact, confirming the finding of Karlan & 
List (2007) that an increase in the matching rate above one neither significantly affects 
checkbook giving nor the extensive margin.  
3.4. Intensive margin 
As with the analysis of checkbook giving, the evidence on the intensive margin seems to depend 
on whether or not a signaling effect is included. Compared to a baseline without lead donor, the 
intensive margin exhibits a non-negative response: Karlan & List (2007) do not find a 
significant impact, while Huck & Rasul (2011) find a significant increase of 35.9% due to a 0.5 
match, but an insignificant one in case of a match of 1. Again, Eckel & Grossman (2008) 
emphasize the relevance of heterogeneity. They show that decreasing the effective price due to 
matching raises only the intensive margin of continuous members, with the corresponding price 
elasticity amounting to –0.099. 
If instead a lead donor control group is used, the effect becomes negative (Huck & Rasul 2011; 
Adena & Huck 2017). The magnitude of a match of 1 ranges from a 24% decrease in Adena & 
Huck (2017) to a 35% decrease in Huck & Rasul (2011). Gneezy et al. (2014), in contrast, do 
not find a significant effect when using a lead donor treatment, but estimate a significant 
positive one with a simple contribution decision as control. However, the fact that potential 
donors can only choose between three different donation amounts might explain this difference.  
3.5. Long-term effect 
So far, we have focused on the effect of matching on immediate contribution decisions. What 
about long-term consequences, especially if the matching offer is subsequently removed? A 
negative long-run effect might arise from intertemporal substitution or a persistent reduction of 
intrinsic motivation; whereas habit formation potentially keeps contributions at a high level if 
they have been increased by matching in the first place (Meier 2007). Studying the donation 
decision students regularly face when paying their tuition fees, Meier (2007) finds a negative 
7 As the authors point out, the contribution decision is directly linked to a private consumption choice, which rather 
makes it an impure public good.  
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effect of matching on average checkbook giving after the matching offer has been removed. 
This impact is strong enough to outweigh any positive effect observed in the matching period, 
leading to an overall negative but insignificant point estimate for the net effect of matching on 
checkbook giving. In contrast, Karlan et al. (2011) find no effect of matching on average 
checkbook giving during treatment but an increase in checkbook giving in the six subsequent 
months. As pointed out by the authors, this result should be treated with caution, since the 
timing of the study might be crucial and significance diminishes as soon as a logarithmic 
specification is used. Kesternich et al. (2016) identify a persistent effect of matching compared 
to the control group. For repeated bookings with the match still in place as well as for 
subsequent bookings in a period where the match is removed, the treatment group facing a 
match of 1 has a significantly higher extensive margin and checkbook giving. However, this 
neither holds for a match of 1/3 nor 3. While these studies focus on contributions to a public 
good which was previously matched, Bekkers (2015) investigates long-term consequences for 
the provision level of a public good which is related to the one previously matched. Individuals 
complete an online survey and allocate their reward between themselves and to one of three 
health charities. Looking at their giving behavior in the context of a tsunami relief campaign 
nine months later reveals no significant difference in contributions between those which were 
matched and those which were not.  
3.6. Extended considerations 
In the following, we shift our focus back to short-term impacts. As pointed out above, general 
features of the setting might heavily influence the effectiveness of matching. Karlan et al. 
(2011) test an alternative representation in which the matching rate of 1/3 is indicated as $25 
for each $75 donated. It turns out that this negatively affects checkbook giving as well as the 
likelihood of donating. A similar alternative representation of the match of 1 as $25 for each 
$25 donated does not create any significant effect. Neither stating a matching limit nor using 
sample donations to illustrate a match appear to be significant (Karlan & List 2007). 
Highlighting the urgency does not affect matching responses (Karlan et al. 2011).  
Although the major part of the literature focuses on linear matching, alternative forms are 
considered as well. The mechanism in Meier (2007) can be interpreted as threshold matching, 
since individuals’ checkbook giving is only matched if they donate the fixed amount to both 
funds. Huck et al. (2015) introduce a different kind of threshold matching, in which individuals 
are only matched by a rate of 1 if they give at least $50. This particular setting significantly 
increases the likelihood of contributing compared to a lead donor treatment. At the same time, 
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however, it negatively affects the intensive margin. On the aggregate, average checkbook 
giving per solicitation remains unaffected. The performance of this matching scheme does not 
substantially differ from a simple linear match of 1 already analyzed by Huck & Rasul (2011), 
mainly because the threshold is below what potential donors give anyways. Another matching 
type investigated by Huck et al. (2015) consists of a fixed gift of $20 for any positive donation. 
Unsurprisingly, this significantly increases the extensive margin while heavily decreasing the 
intensive one. In contrast to the threshold match, the latter effect outweighs the increase in the 
extensive margin, such that average checkbook giving significantly decreases. The data suggest 
that the checkbook giving under this matching mechanism is the lowest compared to the 
threshold match, a matching rate of 1 or 0.5, lead donor, and no lead donor baseline. However, 
the impact of both matching schemes is likely to heavily depend on the threshold at which the 
match or gift is offered. A counterfactual simulation makes the authors conclude that a charity 
is best off, if it simply announces a lead donor. If the charity is forced to use the lead donor’s 
money in a matching scheme, they suggest using a fixed matching gift for a strictly positive 
threshold. However, it is worth noting that the structural model used for the counterfactual 
simulations over-predicts particularly the checkbook giving for fixed gift matching.  
Another matching alternative is presented in Meer (2017), who investigates daily data from an 
online fundraising platform. Projects that satisfy certain observable criteria receive a match of 
1 from partners of the website or an “Almost Home” match, in which all of the needed funds 
are provided by a partner organization as long as the last $100 are raised by private donors. This 
represents a cumulative matching threshold for all potential donors. In a pooled analysis of both 
schemes, matching is found to significantly increase the likelihood of receiving a donation on 
a given day (by 0.76 percentage points, with a baseline of 3 percentage points), while having a 
slightly negative effect on the checkbook giving received per day, conditional on receiving a 
positive amount. As a result, average checkbook giving is raised by 2.8%. The field experiment 
by Meer (2017) emphasizes that the public good does not need to be linear. It might have some 
threshold which needs to be reached as otherwise money is returned.  
Rondeau & List (2008) investigate matching in the context of threshold public goods using a 
laboratory and a field experiment. In the laboratory experiment, they compare a match of 1 with 
a threshold public good at $45 to a lead donor announcement of $22.5 and simple no matching 
settings with varying thresholds ($45, $22.5). A crowding-out effect in checkbook giving due 
to matching is apparent relative to no matching. However, it loses significance when a lead 
donor baseline is used. This is at odds with previous findings in the context of linear public 
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goods, in which using a lead donor control corrected estimates rather downwards and the lead 
donor treatment outperformed the no lead donor control. These differences do not persist in the 
field experiment. A match of 1 in a mail-out to Sierra Club members with a comparable setup 
as in the laboratory creates a more severe decrease in checkbook giving when using a lead donor 
baseline and the lead donor treatment acquires the highest checkbook giving. Although not 
tested for significance, the point estimate is negative (with and without lead donor), still 
differing from the predominantly non-negative effects on checkbook giving in the linear public 
good case. Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that this difference is driven by the design of the 
public good, as (i) some subgroups in the linear case were identified to be negatively affected, 
and (ii) we do not know whether the point estimates are significantly different from zero.  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Matching mechanisms are applied frequently – especially in fundraising campaigns – making 
their effectiveness an object of particular interest. While the empirical literature in this context 
is extensive, especially the one discussing experiments on charitable giving, different 
approaches and surrounding conditions affect the comparability of results. The selective 
literature review at hand classifies results according to four measures of effectiveness, used to 
offer a clearer picture and to allow a more diversified assessment of the matching approach. 
Being as general as possible, a linear match increases the level of public good provision 
commonly with a price elasticity no larger than –1. Results on checkbook giving are less distinct 
but reveal a tendency of no or a rather positive effect on the aggregate, driven by a non-negative 
effect on the likelihood of giving (extensive margin) and average contribution conditional on 
contributing a positive amount (intensive margin).  
Nevertheless, results, and therefore recommendations, are context specific. A threshold public 
good might turn a non-negative effect on checkbook giving into a negative one, crowding out 
the individual’s contribution (see Rondeau & List 2008). Additionally, responses can differ 
across target groups (e.g. a negative effect on the extensive margin of continuous members in 
Eckel & Grossman 2008), which can lead to wrong conclusions about the effectiveness when 
only the aggregate level is considered (Karlan et al. 2011). Empirical evidence on 
heterogeneous effects is rare and offers opportunities for future research. In particular, it would 
be interesting to see whether the response of certain subgroups (like more involved individuals) 
follows a general pattern.  
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Although a match is expected to be effective because it decreases the effective price of a public 
good, the empirical literature suggests that this might not be the single driver. Especially in field 
experiments with between-subject designs the match potentially sends a signal of the good 
being worth contributing to (Huck & Rasul 2011). Including a lead donor control to isolate the 
price effect generally corrects estimates downwards. However, this does not urge future 
research to use a lead donor as baseline. It is rather a question of which comparison is more 
interesting from one’s own perspective. Pertaining to estimate the price elasticity of giving, it 
might indeed be important to use a lead donor baseline, as this allows eliminating (or at least 
mitigating) a signaling effect of matching (Huck & Rasul 2011). Another potential source of 
distortion when estimating the price elasticity of giving is that not all treated subjects might be 
aware of the match offer (Eckel & Grossman 2017), especially in field experiments. If the 
subject’s perceived price of giving differs from the one assumed by the researcher, price 
elasticity estimates are biased. Eckel & Grossman (2017) account for this by requiring 
individuals to check a box to receive the offered match. When only those checking the box are 
treated as receiving the match and facing the reduced effective price, the price elasticity estimate 
increases in absolute terms. One direction for future research is to shed more light on the extent 
to which the effect of matching is actually driven by the price reduction, helping to understand 
how observed behavioral responses come about.  
A crucial remark is that even if linear matching raises charity income or, more general, public 
good provision, it might not be the best strategy at hand. First, matching does not need to be 
linear. Other matching forms like threshold matching could offer additional advantages, though 
they need to be designed very carefully (Huck et al. 2015). Future research can help to extend 
the available matching forms, understand their benefits as well as drawbacks, and eventually 
create generally valid guidelines about when to use which form.   
Second, the money of the third party might be used in a different way, e.g. as an unconditional 
and announced lead donor gift. As pointed out above, comparing the match to a lead donor 
treatment generally corrects effects downwards. Although checkbook giving in the matching 
condition never falls significantly below that of the lead donor treatment (Gneezy et al. 2014; 
Huck et al. 2015; Adena & Huck 2017), point estimates speak in favor of a lead donor in two 
of three studies (Gneezy et al. 2014; Huck et al. 2015). Another promising alternative strategy 




Third, potential business stealing due to matching needs to be considered, at least on the broader 
level. For example, an individual might decide to increase the contribution to one good at the 
expense of investing in another. Meer (2017) finds that the number of matched competitors 
positively affects checkbook giving, although the magnitude is very small. Even an 
intertemporal cannibalization is rejected, since the average daily number of competitors over 
the previous sixty days has a small but significantly positive effect on checkbook giving. 
However, this is only a single study in a very specific setting of school projects trying to raise 
funds on an online platform. Further evidence on how matching affects giving to competing 
charities is needed.  
Finally, future research should put more emphasize on the long-term impact of a matching 
mechanism in terms of repeated treatment (see Kesternich et al. 2016) or after the match has 
been removed (see Meier 2007; Bekkers 2015; Kesternich et al. 2016). Only a few studies take 
the long-term perspective into account. A more detailed analysis extending the observation 
period could help to verify how matches affect individuals’ long-term contribution decisions: 
Can matches form habits and keep contributions to the public good on a higher level or does 
matching rather cause harm due to intertemporal substitution or motivational crowding?  
While we have learned a lot about matching from the empirical literature, many questions, as 
indicated above, remain open. Closing these research gaps not only elevates our level of 
understanding, but enables practitioners to improve the design of fundraising schemes and 
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Table A1: Overview on short-term effects of one-sided matching experiments 


















Adena & Huck (2017)  Field yes yes 1  +2.4%** +0.6** -23.7%**  













The Checkbook giving and 
intensive margin results presented 
are based on fractions of the 
endowment passed, since 
endowments differ across 
individuals, who get money for 
answering a survey.  








Tested for significance in Davis 
(2006). Results refer to charitable 


















Reformulates decision problem to 
shift focus towards amount the 
charity receives. 
Endowment $8/$12. 
[Data from Davis et al. (2005) 






































   
Primary focus on comparing 
rebates and matches. Reported 
result is for endowment level $6. 
Significant effect of decreasing the 
effective price due to matching on 
inclusive contributions in random 
effects tobit model. 
Eckel & Grossman 





   
Endowment $4/$6/$7.5.  
Significant effect of decreasing the 
effective price due to matching on 





































Continuing/ lapsed/ prospect 
members. 
Considering matching rates pooled 
reveals significant decrease in 
response rate for continuing 
members but not for others. 
Regression results identify a 
significant negative price elasticity 
of the intensive margin for 
continuing members (-0.099) but 
not for others. 









Additionally, $5 was donated by 
the researchers for each survey 
completed. Significant effect on 
checkbook giving, but significance 






















Gneezy et al. (2014) Field yes yes 1  Not sig. Not sig. Not sig. Individuals can donate nothing, $20, $50 or $100. 
Gneezy et al. (2014) Field yes no 1  +51.9%***d +1.05***d +15.7%***d Individuals can donate nothing, $20, $50 or $100. 
Huck & Rasul (2011) Field yes yes 
0.5 
1 





Huck & Rasul (2011) Field yes no 
0.5 
1 





Huck et al. (2015) Field yes yes 
0.5  Not sig.   
Results for matching rates 0.5 and 
1 are based on same data as Huck 
& Rasul (2011). Only new insights 
reported here. 
1  Not sig.   
1 above 
€50 




 -29.2%*d +1.2***d -47.6%***d 
Huck et al. (2015) Field yes no 
0.5  +50.2%**d   
Results for matching rates 0.5 and 
1 are based on same data as Huck 
& Rasul (2011). Only new insights 
reported here. 
1  + 37.6 %*d   
1 above 
€50 




 Not sig. +1.0**d Not sig. 
















Pooled analysis of matching vs. 
control: +18.9%* checkbook 
giving, +0.4*** extensive margin 































Significant positive effect on 
checkbook giving in post-
experiment period. 














Binary decision of whether or not 
to offset carbon emissions from 
bus travel.  








Effect of each matching treatment 
on inclusive contributions is 
significantly positive in tobit 
regression where matching effect 

















+2.8%*** +0.76*** -1.5%* 
Results are based on pooled 
analysis of 1:1 and threshold gift 
match. Units of observation are not 
donations of individuals but 
fundraising results of different 
projects on different days. The 
intensive margin is thus the 
average effect on the checkbook 
giving, received by projects 
considering only those day-project 































 Students face decision whether to 
contribute fixed amounts to no, 
one or two funds. Only in latter 
case match is received if offered. 
The extensive margin refers to the 
likelihood of contributing to both 
funds. Marginal effects are not 
reported by the author. 
Rondeau & List (2008) Field yes no 1 
 
-10.4%c,d +0.79d Not sig. 
Threshold public good with 
contributions returned if not 
reached. Also has control with 
different threshold than matching 
treatment, but results are not 
reported here. 
Rondeau & List (2008) Field yes yes 1 
 
-23.9%c,d -0.14d, Not sig. 
Threshold public good with 
contributions returned if not 
reached.  
Rondeau & List (2008) Lab no no 1 
 
-23.5%*** 
  Threshold public good with 
contributions returned if not 
reached. Also has control with 
different threshold, but results are 
not reported here 
Public good game.  
Rondeau & List (2008) Lab no yes 1 
 
Not sig. 
  Threshold public good with 
contributions returned if not 
reached. 
Public good game.  
Using regression results whenever applicable. Papers consider the donation framework if not otherwise stated in the comment section. Matching rates of 0.33 and 1/3 
are sometimes used interchangeably. If instructions are provided, we use the corresponding matching rate, otherwise we rely on the rate stated in the paper. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.10 in conducted test. Values without asterisk are not tested for significance. 
a With respect to match vs. control. 
b Since the tables in Davis et al. (2005) and Davis (2006) showed inconsistencies, values are based on own calculations using the data retrieved October 10, 2017, 
from http://www.people.vcu.edu/~dddavis/vita.htm. 
c Adjusted for undelivered solicitations. 
d calculated using descriptive statistics, e.g. reported means or the response rates.  
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